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Introduction 
The "Seveso II" Directive (96/82/EC) is aimed at the prevention of the major 
accident hazards involving dangerous substances, and the limitation of their 
consequences for man and the environment, with a view to ensuring high levels 
of protection throughout the Community in a consistent and effective manner. A 
requirement for a "Safety Report" is included in the Directive as one of the 
principal measures to achieve this aim. 
This document is intended to provide guidance to assist with the interpretation of 
the requirements on "Safety Reports" contained in the Directive. This guidance is 
not legislation. It should not be considered mandatory and does not preclude 
other reasonable interpretations of the requirements in the Directive. 
The relevant text from the Directive is contained in Article 9 on "Safety Report" 
and Annex II on "Minimum data and information to be considered in the safety 
report specified in Article 9". For convenience, this text is included in Annex A 
and the subsequent sections add further interpretative guidance to elaborate 
where considered useful. The guidance is intended to specify the information to 
be contained in the report but is not intended to prescribe a particular format for 
the presentation of information as such. In particular, the structure and format of 
a safety report for an establishment covering several installations is considered 
flexible such that an operator can consider the best way to present "common 
aspects" for the establishment and specific details for each installation which can 
present a major accident hazard (words in italics are defined in the Directive). 
References consulted in the drafting of this guidance and other relevant titles are 
listed in Annex D.I. 
Sam Porter 
for the DG XI. E. 1 
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Description of the Establishment 
General 
The safety report should contain an adequate description of the 
establishment to enable the control authorities to have a clear picture of its 
purpose, location, activities and intrinsic hazards, services and technical 
equipment for safe operation. The extent of the description should be 
commensurate to the hazards of the establishments. The description should 
also aim at clarifying the interrelations among the different installations and 
systems within the establishment, both as far as the common services and the 
overall management of the establishment are concerned. 
An introductory section should contain general information on the 
establishment, i.e. 
• purpose of the establishment; 
• main activities and production; 
• history and development of the activities including the status of 
authorizations for operations already agreed and/or granted; 
• the number of persons working at the establishments (i.e. internal and 
contractors' personnel, specifying working times, visitors, etc.); 
• general statements characterizing the establishment with respects to its 
main hazards due to relevant substances and processes. 
Management and organization 
3 As the organizational aspects are an integral part of the safety system, the 
safety report should describe the structure of the organization, including 
distribution of functions and responsibilities relevant to the safe operation of 
the establishment and its installations. 
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Location 
4 The description of the establishment should contain data on topography 
and accessibility to the site at a degree of detail commensurate with the 
extent of the hazards and the vulnerability of the surroundings. 
5 The submitted topographic maps should be of an adequate scale and should 
include the establishment and surrounding developments within an area of 
sufficient extent in relation with the possible impact of accidents (the scale of 
the maps must be indicated, different scaled maps may be necessary when 
long distance effects are foreseeable). 
6 On such maps the land use pattern (i.e. industry, agriculture, urban 
settlements, environmentally sensitive locations etc.) and the location of the 
most important buildings and infrastructures (i.e. hospitals, schools, other 
industrial sites, motorway /railway networks, stations and marshaling yards, 
airports, harbors, etc.) must be clearly indicated. 
7 Also on the maps access routes to the establishment should be clearly 
indicated as well as the escape routes from the establishment and other 
traffic routes significant for rescue and emergency operations 
Lay out of the establishment 
8 The lay-out of the establishment as a whole and of its relevant 
installations should be clearly presented on adequately scaled plans. 
Relevant diagrams and/or pictures of particular sections or equipment should 
be presented in an appropriately larger scale. 
9 The lay-out should adequately identify installations and other activities of 
the establishment including: 
• main storage facilities; 
• process installations; 
• location of relevant substances and their quantities; 
10 
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• relevant equipment (including vessels and pipes); 
• spacing of the installations and their main sections; 
• clearance between flammable liquid storage tanks in multi-storage sites, etc.; 
• utilities, services and fire water retention; 
• escape routes from the installations and across the establishment; 
• control rooms and office rooms. 
The environment and surroundings of the establishment 
10 The description of the natural environment and the surroundings of the 
establishment should be detailed to an extent proportionate to the hazard. It 
should demonstrate that the natural environment and surrounding activities 
have been sufficiently analyzed by the operator to identify both the hazards 
they pose to safe operation and the vulnerability of the area to the impact of 
major accidents. 
11 When already defined, the land use pattern of the areas around the 
establishment may be presented as specified in the official land use plan of the 
greater area. This kind of information will support the assignment of the relevant 
measures against potential effects of a major accident on neighboring 
inhabitants, ecosystems, properties and activities. 
12 To the degree in which accident consequences may affect the 
surroundings of the establishment, relevant information should be supplied on: 
a. inhabited areas (e.g. description of the areas including population 
densities); 
b. establishments receiving the public, meeting points (regular or 
occasional); 
c. sensitive public buildings (schools, hospitals, churches, police stations, 
fire stations, telephone switchboards, etc.); 
d. conservation areas, registered monuments and areas of tourist 
attraction; 
e. public utilities, possibly affected by accident consequences, in the vicinity 
(electricity, gas, telephone, water, sewers and treatment plant, etc.). 
I I 
GUIDANCE ON THE PREPARATION OF A SAFETY REPORT (SEVESO II) 
13 External activities and developments may both be sources of hazards to 
the establishment and also be affected by accidents possibly originating in 
the establishment. The safety report should give adequate evidence that both 
kind of hazards have been identified. The description should include: 
• industrial activities external to the establishment (i.e. nature of - and 
spacing with regard to - other establishments, limitations imposed by 
other establishments etc.); 
• traffic routes and major transportation centers (i.e. roads, railways, 
waterways, ports, airports, marshalling yards etc.). 
14 As the natural environment of an establishment may present potential 
hazard sources, influence the development of an accident, and be affected by 
the consequences of an accident, data will be needed for the description of 
the relevant environmental factors. In general this includes meteorological 
data such as: 
• average and maximum indices on precipitation (rain, snow, hail); 
• thunderstorms; 
• lightning; 
• humidity, fog, frost; 
• winds (direction, speed); 
• stability classes; 
• maximum and minimum recorded temperatures, 
and geological, hydrological and hydrographie site data such as: 
• general geological context; 
• type and conditions of the ground/underground; 
• seismic data; 
• flooding and landslides; 
• other site specific natural hazards (uncontrolled fires, volcanic activities etc.). 
Certain data can be omitted; however the reason for their exclusion should be given. 
The safety report should also present the data concerning the vulnerability of 
the natural environment to the impact of major accidents. The following 
environmental factors may be relevant: 
• surface and ground water; 
• water quality and uses; 
12 
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1 shore and marine environment; 
1 areas of special environmental interest i.e. natural protected areas, 
protected fauna and flora species, sensitive ecosystems, areas of 
outstanding natural beauty, etc. 
Dangerous Substances 
15 The safety report should give relevant particulars of types and quantities of 
dangerous substances to which the Directive applies at the establishment. 
The substance can fall in any of the following categories: 
• raw materials; 
• intermediate products; 
• finished products; 
• by-products; 
• wastes and auxiliary products; 
• products formed as a result of loss of control of chemical processes. 
For the eligible dangerous substances, data to be provided should include: 
a. type and origin of the substance (i.e. CAS Number, IUPAC Name, 
commercial name, empirical formula, chemical composition, degree of 
purity if relevant, the most important contamination, etc.); 
b. physical and chemical properties (i.e. characteristic temperatures and 
pressures, concentration and phases at normal and at the onset of 
abnormal conditions, equilibrium data and operation curves if relevant, 
thermodynamic and transport properties, data on phase changes, flash 
points, ignition temperatures, combustibility of solids, spontaneous-
ignition temperatures, explosion limits, thermal stability data, data on 
reactions and their rates, decomposition etc.); 
c. toxicological, flammability and explosive characteristics (i.e. toxicity, 
persistence, irritant effects, long-term effects, synergistic effects, 
warning symptoms, effects to the environment, ecotoxic data, etc.). 
d. others (e.g. corrosion characteristics in particular relating to the 
containment' material). 
13 
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Most information may be found in safety data-sheets (including maximum 
permissible working concentrations, relevant threshold levels, reference to 
guidelines for health at the work place, methods and means to detect their 
presence in the workplace and/or in the case of loss of containment, etc.). 
Hazardous installations and activities 
16 The description of hazardous activities (processes/storage) shall indicate 
the purpose and the basic features of the related operations within the 
establishment which are important to safety and may be sources of major 
risks. This should cover: 
a. basic operations; 
b. chemical reactions, physical and biological conversions and 
transformations; 
c. on -site interim storage; 
d. other storage related activities i.e. loading-unloading, transport 
including pipework, etc.; 
e. discharge, retention, re-use and recycling or disposal of residues and 
wastes; 
f. discharge and treatment of waste gases; 
g. other process stages, especially treatment and processing operations. 
17 Further details may be required of the safety relevant sections in 
accordance with the hazard analysis. This description should thus include a 
substantial amount of data significant from the process engineering and 
technical safety standpoint; and cover the safety systems as well. This may 
include: 
a. flow charts and Piping and Instrumentation ( P&I ) diagrams; 
b. flow patterns and machinery / equipment needed in the processes; 
inventories and key dimensions of the containers and pipes shall be 
available if relevant; 
14 
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c. process conditions i.e. pressure, temperature, concentration (their safe 
operation ranges) and any relevant thermodynamic and transport 
properties at the successive steps of the process such as: 
• normal and maximum flows, consumption of reactants, production of 
intermediate/end-/by-products (e.g. overall and substance mass 
balances); 
• average or typical quantities normally or accidentally possible to be 
present, stored or in process; 
• formation conditions of by-products and unplanned accident 
products; 
• conditioning of the final products; 
d. instrumentation, control/alarm and other safety systems; 
e. relevant qualitative and quantitative information on energy and mass 
transport in the processes i.e. material and energy balances, 
• in normal running; 
• in start-up or shut-down periods; 
• during abnormal operations; 
f. characteristic process conditions and substance state parameters (i.e. 
temperature/pressure/concentration/boil-off fluctuation etc.). 
Sufficient information should be provided in the safety report to permit the 
competent authority to assess the adequacy of the controls, but reference can 
be made to other documents available to the authority on request. 
18 The safety report should also provide an outline description of the 
procedures for safe operation in all process stages, which includes: 
a. operations (e.g. normal running, shut-down and start-up, exceptional 
operations, emergency and safety procedures); 
b. specific precautions during storage, transport or handling because of 
specific characteristic of the substance (e.g. protection from vibration 
or from ambient humidity). 
19 Structural characteristics and other design data of the storage or process 
plant handling the dangerous substances should be supplied in the form of 
the applied standards used for their design. A more analytical presentation of 
15 
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such data may be required for the parts of the establishment in which major 
hazards are encountered. The description need not enter into great detail, but 
should refer to other documents, available to the authority on request, 
covering certain relevant topics such as: 
• choice of materials important to safety; 
• foundations; 
• design of equipment under high pressure or temperature and their 
supports; 
• size; 
• stability (static calculations, conditions and load - bearing capacity of 
the ground); 
• design against external events. 
Services 
20 The presentation of the establishment services should specify important 
characteristics of such utilities (i.e. emergency service, primary/secondary 
etc.). The description should make clear which services/supplies are in 
common to more or all installations, and which are installation specific and 
should include the relevant back-up systems. The following topics should be 
addressed if relevant: 
Outside supplies 
• outside electrical, other power sources supply; 
• outside supply of water; 
• outside supply of other fluids or solids. 
Utilities inside the establishment 
• production of power internally, fuel supply and storage: 
• internal electrical distribution network; 
• back-up electrical supply (emergency supply); 
• fire-fighting and supply arrangements; 
16 
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• hot water and other fluid distribution networks; 
• communication systems; 
• instrument air. 
Other services 
• health and safety (working environment); 
• medical service; 
• control centers, emergency refuges, muster points; 
• rescue service (emergency); 
• service of guarding and controlling the access; 
• environmental service; 
• equipment inspection service; 
• maintenance and repair workshop; 
• laboratory, etc. 
Waste treatment systems 
• sewer network and waste water systems; 
• arrangements for controlling and collecting fire water run-off. 
Monitoring services 
• weather stations; 
• services for detecting toxic products in the air; 
• services for detecting toxic products in the sewers/discharges to surface 
and ground water; 
• services for detecting and alarms for fires / explosive atmospheres; 
• services for monitoring access and detecting intrusions. 
17 
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Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment 
Introduction 
1 The safety report should demonstrate that the operator has identified the 
major accident hazard and assessed the risks associated with the installations 
and other activities in the establishment. The safety report should present the 
results of the hazard analysis and risk assessment performed by the operator, the 
extent of which should be commensurate to the risk. In general the hazard 
analysis should document the identification of hazard sources, the relative 
likelihood of major accident and their consequences. 
2 There exist several approaches to hazard analysis and risk assessment 
(either qualitative or quantitative), each of which can give sound insights 
into the safety situation if used consistently. It is beyond the scope of the 
present guidance to attempt to describe or evaluate these methodologies, 
examples of which can be found in various references listed in the annexes 
of this document. 
3 The choice of the specific technique may be site-specific or risk-specific. 
In any case the effort implied should be proportional to the extent of possible 
damage. Quantified arguments might be a convenient way of limiting the 
scope of the safety report by demonstrating either that an adverse event has a 
very remote probability of occurring or that a particular consequence is 
relatively minor. Quantified arguments in the context of risk assessment does 
not necessarily mean quantification of risk in terms of chance of death. 
Social or environmental harm could be considered. Quantification of 
consequence and /or event frequency could be in several cases a sufficient 
basis for judgment. 
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Whatever the approach adopted, the hazard analysis should achieve the 
four objectives of 
i. identification of the safety relevant sections (installations or parts of 
an installation); 
ii. identification of the hazard sources; 
iii. assessment of the consequences of potential major accidents, and 
iv. assignment and assessment of adequacy of the prevention, control and 
mitigation measures. 
Usually the hazard analysis involves an iterative process to ensure that the 
safety objectives are fully met. A possible outline of the procedure is 
presented here: 
Step A focuses on identification and analysis of the sections that have a 
major accident potential without however excluding the remaining 
sections from receiving the appropriate safety attention. The 
sections posing a significant major accident potential because of the 
substances handled or processed are thus identified as safety 
relevant sections. 
Step Β aims at identifying those hazard sources which may cause a major 
accident in the safety relevant sections. In addition, the conditions 
under which a major accident could occur and the consequences of 
those accidents, should be determined. 
Step C aims at assessing the prevention, control and mitigation measures 
assigned. 
A Risk Assessment can be used to determine the likelihood of the major 
accidents and demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to protect 
man, property and the environment. Available techniques for risk assessment 
based on qualitative methods, semi-quantitative criteria or fully quantitative 
methods are referred to in Annexes D.2, D.3, D.4 and D.5. 
20 
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Step A - Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
6 A Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) should identify the safety relevant 
sections of the establishment. These sections are characterized by the 
quantity and the intrinsic properties of dangerous substances and/or the 
processes involved and hence constitute the parts of the establishment 
requiring more detailed hazard analysis. The PHA can be accomplished 
using a variety of hazard screening methods; examples are listed in Annex D.2. 
7 Lessons from past incidents and operating experience can make a 
significant contribution to the selected hazard screening method and to its 
results. A relevant list of accidents in similar storage or process facilities is 
considered useful. 
8 Section identification can be by the use of Hazard Index methods, the 
identification of threshold criteria such as a fraction of the qualifying 
quantity of the dangerous substance in Annex I of the Directive, or other 
suitable methods. The criteria should take into account the physical and 
chemical properties of the substance and the accident consequence potential 
of the process conditions. Therefore threshold criteria may result in values 
well below the limits in the directive. This procedure should consider all 
parts of the establishment capable of generating conditions for a major 
accident. 
9 The choice of the PHA methodology should be explained in the safety 
report and the criteria used for the decision clearly discussed. 
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Step Β - Identification of hazard sources and evaluation of 
consequences of major accidents 
Identification of hazard sources 
10 Hazard sources may be defined as conditions or events which threaten the 
safe operation of the establishment, installation or plant. Such sources 
should be identified in all phases of operation (start-up, normal operation, 
shut-down, loading/ unloading etc.). 
11 Hazard sources may be linked with: 
operation i.e. human errors during operations, testing and maintenance, 
malfunctions and technical failures of equipment, failures of 
containment, physical or chemical process parameters beyond prescribed 
limits, faults in utility supplies, etc.; 
external events i.e. impact of neighboring activities, transport, natural 
hazards, etc.; 
security i.e. unauthorized interventions; 
other causes related to design, construction, and safety management i.e. 
design inadequacy, design errors, inadequacy of operational procedures. 
equipment or process modifications, inadequate work permit system, 
inadequate maintenance, etc. 
12 Hazard source identification is a crucial step in the analysis. The safety 
report should outline the principles and procedures followed to determine the 
hazard sources. Whatever system is adopted for hazard identification, 
accident databases should be consulted and lessons learnt from past 
incidents incorporated. Hazard sources which have already resulted in an 
accident should be considered credible where the processes and conditions 
are analogous. 
13 Identification of hazard sources is best carried out by a team whose 
members have a range of skills, technical/professional knowledge gained 
from safety inspections, from the operation of establishments/installations of 
this or comparable types and insights gained from modeling techniques (see also 
Annex B). 
22 
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Operational Hazard Sources 
14 Depending on the extent of the consequences of the potential major 
hazards, the sources of hazard may be determined by simple means such as 
checklists, or by more complex methods such as HAZOP, FMEA, etc. 
Reference to different methods can be found in Annex D.3. 
15 Where checklists are used they should not be regarded as exhaustive. As a 
minimum, checklists, should consider the following aspects: 
a. physical and chemical process parameters limits; 
b. hazards during specific operation modes (i.e. start up / shut down); 
c. failure of containment; 
d. malfunctions and technical failures of equipment and systems; 
e. knock-on effects from other equipment; 
f. faults of utilities supply; 
g. human factors involving operation, testing and maintenance; 
h. chemical compatibility and contamination; 
i. the build-up of electrostatic charge and other ignition sources. 
16 The above factors should be investigated with respect to the part they 
could play in possible accidents i.e. toxic gas releases, explosions, releases 
of flammable substances with or without ignition, major fires, runaway 
reactions and hazardous releases to the environment. The relevant contents 
of the safety report and reference to the most commonly used hazard 
identification methods for use with exothermic or runaway reactions can be 
found in Annex B, whereas reference to techniques for evaluating accident 
developments (i.e. cause-consequence diagrams, event trees - fault trees 
techniques etc.) can be found in Annex D.5. 
17 The choice of the hazard identification techniques used should be 
explained in the safety report and the assumptions clearly discussed. 
23 
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External Hazard Sources 
18 External activities or events are an important source of hazard. The safety 
report should identify those sources relevant to the site and discuss their 
possible impact. Again, historical data will provide a useful indication of the 
likelihood and impact of such events. Where required by the competent 
authority the concern of accidents arising from "domino" effects should be 
considered in the report. A list of possible external hazard sources, relevant 
studies and analysis methods can be found in Annex C. 
Plant security 
19 The consequences arising from unauthorized actions at the site should be 
considered. 
Other sources related to design, construction and safety management 
20 Other hazard sources are related to the management of whole life cycle of 
the establishment and its plants (i.e. design, construction, installation, 
commissioning, decommissioning, equipment or process modifications, work 
permit system, maintenance, etc.). The safety report should discuss the 
measures taken to control such hazards (see also section 3). Alternatively the 
safety report should refer to other document describing the Major Accident 
Prevention Policy and the Safety Management System. 
Consequence assessment 
21 Assessment of accident consequences to people and environment is 
essential in several steps of analysis, and the safety report should summarize 
and document the conclusions of such analysis 
a. Consequence assessment constitutes an indispensable part in the 
systematic hazard analysis to help establish technical/organizational 
safeguards to prevent major accident hazards and to mitigate the 
consequences of accidents. Such assessment can be based on 
judgment, qualitative or simplified models, unless accurate 
quantification is required; 
24 
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b. Consequence assessment describes the outcomes of selected accident 
scenarios to provide information for general major accident hazard 
control, emergency planning (internal and external) and for land use 
planning around establishments. Such assessment should then be based 
on appropriate quantitative models. 
There exist a number of different means to accomplish such a task 
consistently. Relevant information on these matters can be found in the 
literature (Annex D.5) with insights also into environmental parameters 
(fauna, flora, air, soil, surface and ground water) and available impact 
analysis methods (Annex D.6). 
22 All the assumptions made and references to computer codes and 
experimental results used for the assessment should be adequately explained 
and documented in the safety report. 
25 
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Step C 
Prevention, Control and Mitigation measures 
23 Hazards should be possibly avoided or reduced at source through the 
application of inherently safe practices. When risk remain, then risk 
principles such as ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) can be used 
in determining the level of measures required. The measures should: 
a. prevent a malfunction from arising in the establishment; 
b. prevent the occurrence of abnormal operation which could lead to a 
major accident; 
c. mitigate the effects of major accidents on persons or the environment. 
24 Prevention, control and mitigation measures may include: 
• process control system including back ups; 
• fire and explosion protection systems; 
• devices for limiting the size of accidental releases i.e. scrubbing 
systems, water spray; 
• vapour screens, emergency catchpots or collection vessels, emergency 
shut-of valves; 
• alarm systems including gas detection; 
• automatic shut down systems; 
• inerting systems; 
• fail-safe instrumentation; 
• emergency venting including explosion panels; 
• fast shut-down and other emergency procedures; 
• special precautions against unauthorized actions related to the plant 
security (addressed in confidential reports available to CA on request). 
Assessment of prevention, control and mitigation measures 
25 The assessment of the prevention, control and mitigation measures should be 
made in conjunction with the overall risk assessment of the establishment. The 
safety report should discuss general criteria assumed (i.e. best available 
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technology, good engineering practice, quantitative risk criteria), should give 
the reason why a method of presentation has been selected over and above 
other possible options and in particular should describe: 
a. the criteria used to decide the degree of redundancy, diversity and 
separation required for the prevention, control and mitigation measures; 
b. the reliability of components and systems and the efficiency of 
organizational measures; 
c. the functional calculations needed to confirm the capability of the 
measures to cope with the design-basis accidents (design criteria and 
load assumptions according to the relevant good engineering practice; 
time and order in which the measures become effective in relation with 
the process/accident evolution and the man-machine interface etc.); 
d. feedback from measures to the system as a whole; 
e. compliance with relevant national regulations and relevant codes of 
practice. 
26 Such assessment might be made by adopting either qualitative or 
probabilistic reliability analysis techniques and criteria. Reference to 
relevant reliability and availability techniques can be found in Annex D.4. 
Documentation 
27 The safety report should contain a detailed description of the safety 
relevant sections and of the systems and components which are important for 
safety. The description need not duplicate requirements under section 1 and 
can be included in an annex to the safety report. The description should allow 
easy identification of: 
a. those parts of the process or installation containing dangerous 
substances and their location; 
b. those parts of the establishment involving hazardous processes; 
c. elements serving safety relevant functions i.e. prevention, control and 
mitigation measures; and 
d. elements capable of initiating a major accident. 
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Such description should allow a better understanding of the hazard analysis, 
clearly describing the relationship between the hazard sources and their 
prevention, control and mitigating measures, including test, maintenance and 
inspection systems and relevant documentation. 
28 The description should make clear reference to other parts of the 
establishment to allow identification of interactions. Where necessary, 
reference should be made to other documents available to the competent 
authorities on request (e.g. P&I diagrams). Components, processes and 
control parameters important for safety can be listed in a separate annex to 
the safety report. 
Presentation of hazard analysis and risk assessment 
29 The safety report should present the main results and arguments of the 
hazard analysis and risk assessment. The original assessments should be 
accessible to the competent authority on request. The safety report should 
refer to documents available on the hazards analysis and risk assessment 
performed. In particular, documents which contain information on the 
assumptions made, and the judgment criteria adopted should be clearly 
referenced. 
30 The accident scenarios identified in the hazard analysis, their 
consequences and likelihood should be clearly documented so they might be 
used for preparing the basis for further decisional processes (e.g. external 
emergency planning and land use planning). 
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^J Information concerning 
the Major Accident Prevention Policy 
and Emergency Planning 
Major Accident Prevention Policy and Safety Management 
Systems 
1 It has become increasingly clear that the root causes of industrial 
accidents may lie deeply in the management aspects. Therefore the 
management of safety to man and the environment should receive the due 
attention in the safety report. 
2 Safety management may be defined as the aspect of the overall 
management function that determines and implements the safety policy. This 
will involve a whole range of activities, initiatives, programs, etc., focused 
on technical, human and organisational aspects and referring to all the 
individual activities within the organisation, which tend to be formalised as 
Safety Management Systems (SMS). 
3 The safety report should either include or refer to a written statement 
describing the Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) and related Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) of the operator to cope with the major accident 
hazards of the specific establishment. The SMS should cover that part of the 
overall management system which includes the structure of the organisation, 
responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources for 
determining and implementing the MAPP (Annex A pag. 39). 
4 Details on the elements of SMS can be found in a separate guidance note 
developed by the European Commission in conjunction with a Technical 
Working Group. 
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Measures of protection and intervention to limit the 
consequences of an accident 
5 The analysis of major accident hazards in the previous sections included 
consideration of various prevention, control and mitigation measures as part 
of the overall risk assessment of the establishment. The Safety Report should 
also clearly include information which identifies any key mitigation 
measures, resulting from the analysis, which are necessary to limit the 
consequences of major accidents, as referred to in Annex II, part V of the 
Directive (see Annex A), namely: 
• description of the equipment installed in the plant to limit the 
consequences of major accidents; 
• organization of alert and intervention; 
• description of mobilizable resources, internal or external; 
• summary of elements described above necessary for drawing up the 
internal emergency plan. 
Description of equipment 
6 A description of equipment installed in the plant to limit the consequences 
of major accidents shall be provided. This should include an adequate 
description of the circumstances under which the equipment is intended for 
use. 
Organization of alert and intervention 
7 The organisation for alert and intervention should be adequately 
described. This should include: 
a. organisation, responsibilities, and procedures for emergency response; 
b. training and information for personnel and emergency response crews; 
c. activation of warnings and alarms for site personnel, external 
authorities, neighbouring installations, and where necessary for the 
public; 
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d. identification of installations which need protection or rescue 
interventions; 
e. identification of rescue routes, escape routes, emergency refuges, 
sheltered buildings, muster points and control centres; 
f. provision for shut-off of processes, utilities and plants with the 
potential to aggravate the consequences. 
Description of mobilizable resources 
8 The report should contain an adequate description of all relevant resources 
which will need to be mobilized in the event of a major accident. This shall 
include: 
a. activation of external emergency response and co-ordination with 
internal response; 
b. mutual aid agreements with neighbouring operators and mobilisation 
of external resources; 
c. resources available on-site or by agreement (i.e. technical, 
organizational, informational, first aid, specialized medical services, 
etc.). 
Summary of elements for the internal emergency plan 
9 The report should include a summary of elements described above which 
are necessary for the preparation of the internal emergency plan to deal with 
major accidents or foreseeable conditions or events which could be 
significant in bringing about a major accident. It may be useful to include or 
refer to the internal emergency plan which has been drawn up to comply 
with Article 11 of the Directive. A list of relevant references can be found in 
Annex D.7 U 
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Article 9 and annexes II & III 
of COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 96/ 82 /EC, ON THE 
CONTROL OF MAJ OR-ACCIDENT HAZARDS 
INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES 
Article 9 - Safety report 
1 Member States shall require the operator to produce a safety report for the purposes of: 
(a) demonstrating that a major-accident prevention policy and a safety management 
system for implementing it have been put into effect in accordance with the 
information set out in Annex III; 
(b) demonstrating that major-accident hazards have been identified and that the 
necessary measures have been taken to prevent such accidents and to limit their 
consequences for man and the environment; 
(c) demonstrating that adequate safety and reliability have been incorporated into the 
design, construction, operation and maintenance of any installation, storage 
facility, equipment and infrastructure connected with its operation which are 
linked to major-accident hazards inside the establishment; 
(d) demonstrating that internal emergency plans have been drawn up and supplying 
information to enable the external plan to be drawn up in order to take the 
necessary measures in the event of a major accident; 
(e) providing sufficient information to the competent authorities to enable decisions 
to be made in terms of the siting of new activities or developments around 
existing establishments. 
2 The safety report shall contain at least the data and information listed in Annex II. 
It shall also contain an updated inventory of the dangerous substances present in the 
establishment. 
Safety reports, or parts of reports, or any other equivalent reports produced in 
response to other legislation, may be combined to form a single safety report for the 
purposes of this Article, where such a format obviates the unnecessary duplication of 
information and the repetition of work by the operator or competent authority, on 
condition that all the requirements of this Article are complied with. 
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The safety report provided for in paragraph 1 shall be sent to the competent 
authority within the following time limits: 
• for new establishments, a reasonable period of time prior to the start of 
construction or of operation; 
• for existing establishments not previously covered by Directive 82/501/EEC, three 
years from the date laid down in Article 24 (1); 
• for other establishments, two years from the date laid down in Article 24 ( 1 ): 
• in the case of the periodic reviews provided for in paragraph 5, without delay. 
Before the operator commences construction or operation, or in the cases referred 
to in the second, third and fourth indents of paragraph 3, the competent authority 
shall within a reasonable period of receipt of the report: 
• communicate the conclusions of its examination of the safety report to the operator, 
if necessary after requesting further information, or 
• prohibit the bringing into use, or the continued use. of the establishment concerned, 
in accordance with the powers and procedures laid down in Article 17. 
The safety report shall be periodically reviewed and where necessary updated: 
• at least every five years; 
• at any other time at the initiative of the operator or the request of the competent 
authority, where justified by new facts or to take account of new technical 
knowledge about safety matters, for example arising from analysis of accidents or. 
as far as possible, "near misses", and of developments in knowledge concerning the 
assessment of hazards. 
(a) Where it is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that 
particular substances present at the establishment, or any part thereof, are in a 
state incapable of creating a major accident hazard, then the Member State 
may, in accordance with the criteria referred to in subparagraph (b), limit the 
information required in safety reports to those matters which are relevant to 
the prevention of residual major accident hazards and the limitation of their 
consequences for man and the environment. 
(b) Before this Directive is brought into application, the Commission, acting in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 16 of Directive 
82/501/EEC, shall establish harmonized criteria for the decision by the 
competent authority that an establishment is in a state incapable of creating a 
major accident hazard within the meaning of subparagraph (a). Subparagraph 
(a) shall not be applicable until those criteria have been established. 
(c) Member States shall ensure that the competent authority communicates a list of 
the establishments concerned to the Commission, giving reasons. The 
Commission shall forward the lists annually to the Committee referred to in 
Article 22. 
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ANNEX II of the Directive 
Minimum Data and Information to be Considered in the Safety Report Specified in 
Article 9 
I INFORMATION ON THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND ON THE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT WITH A VIEW TO MAJOR 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
This information shall contain the elements given in Annex III. 
II PRESENTA TION OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 
A. description of the site and its environment including the geographical location, 
meteorological, geological, hydrographie conditions and, if necessary, its history; 
B. identification of installations and other activities of the establishment which could 
present a majoraccident hazard; 
C. description of areas where a major accident may occur. 
HI DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTALLA TION 
A. description of the main activities and products of the parts of the establishment 
which are important from the point of view of safety, sources of major-accident 
risks and conditions under which such a major accident could happen, together 
with a description of proposed preventive measures; 
B. description of processes, in particular the operating methods: 
C. description of dangerous substances: 
1) inventory of dangerous substances including: 
- the identification of dangerous substances: chemical name, CAS number, 
name according to IUPAC nomenclature: 
- the maximum quantity of dangerous substances present or likely to be 
present; 
2) physical, chemical, toxicological characteristics and indication of the hazards, 
both immediate and delayed for man and the environment; 
3) physical and chemical behaviour under normal conditions of use or under 
foreseeable accidental conditions. 
IV IDENTIFICATION AND ACCIDENTAL RISKS ANALYSIS AND 
PREVENTION METHODS 
A. detailed description of the possible major-accident scenarios and their probability 
or the conditions under which they occur including a summary of the events 
which may play a role in triggering each of these scenarios, the causes being 
internal or external to the installation; 
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Β. assessment of the extent and severity of the consequences of identified major 
accidents; 
C. description of technical parameters and equipments used for the safety of 
installations. 
V MEASURES OF PROTECTION AND INTER VENTION TO LIMIT THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT 
A. description of the equipment installed in the plant to limit the consequences of 
major accidents; 
B. organization of alert and intervention; 
C. description of mobilizable resources, internal or external: 
D. summary of elements described in A, B, and C above necessary for drawing up 
the internal emergency plan prepared in compliance with Article 11. 
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ANNEX III of the Directive 
Principles Referred to in Article 7 and Information Referred to in Article 9 on the 
Management System and the Organization of the Establishment with a View to the 
Prevention of Major Accidents 
For the purpose of implementing the operator's major-accident prevention policy and 
safety management system account shall be taken of the following elements. The 
requirements laid down in the document referred to in Article 7 should be proportionate to 
the major-accidents hazards presented by the establishment: 
(a) the major accident prevention policy should be established in writing and should 
include the operator's overall aims and principles of action with respect to the control 
of major-accidents hazards; 
(b) the safety management system should include the part of the general management 
system which includes the organizational structure, responsibilities, practices, 
procedures, processes and resources for determining and implementing the major-
accident prevention policy; 
(c) the following issues shall be addressed by the safety management system: 
(i) Organization and personnel - the roles and responsibilities of personnel involved 
in the management of major hazards at all levels in the organization. The 
identification of training needs of such personnel and the provision of the training 
so identified. The involvement of employees and, where appropriate, sub-
contractors. 
(ii) Identification and evaluation of major hazards - adoption and implementation of 
procedures for systematically identifying major hazards arising from normal and 
abnormal operation and the assessment of their likelihood and severity. 
(iii) Operational control - adoption and implementation of procedures and instructions 
for safe operation, including maintenance, of plant, processes, equipment and 
temporary stoppages. 
(tv) Management of change - adoption and implementation of procedures for 
planning modifications to, or the design of new installations, processes or storage 
facilities. 
(v) Planning for emergencies - adoption and implementation of procedures to 
identify foreseeable emergencies by systematic analysis and to prepare, test and 
review emergency plans to respond to such emergencies. 
(vi) Monitoring performance - adoption and implementation of procedures for the 
ongoing assessment of compliance with the objectives set by the operator's 
major-accident prevention policy and safety management system, and the 
mechanisms for investigation and taking corrective action in case of non-
compliance. The procedures should cover the operator's system for reporting 
major accidents or near misses, particularly those involving failure of protective 
measures, and their investigation and followup on the basis of lessons learnt. 
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(vii) Audit and review - adoption and implementation of procedures for periodic 
systematic assessment of the major-accident prevention policy and the 
effectiveness and suitability of the safety management system; the documented 
review of performance of the policy and safety management system and its up-
dating by senior management. 
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LJ Hazardous Reactions 
When hazardous reactions1 are involved within the processes of an installation the safety 
report should contain sufficient information to demonstrate that the operator has identified 
the major accident hazards and assessed the risks associated with the process. This should 
include: 
• Description of the chemical process; 
• Consideration of relevant past events; 
• Hazard identification and risk assessment including consequence evaluation of major 
accidents and the assessment of the preventive, controlling and mitigation measures; 
Description of the chemical process 
The following issues should be addressed if relevant, and referenced data should be 
available related to: 
a. the chemistry involved: 
• type of reactions, for example complex, autocatalytic, secondary etc.; 
• stoichiometry of reaction and heat generation rates at relevant (e.g. runaway) 
conditions; 
• properties of reagents including thermal instability, decomposition, impurities etc. 
b. the reactors and processes involved: 
• design parameters (e.g. pressure and temperature) of the reactors and associated 
equipment, and where available reliability data; 
• flow charts or P&Is involving the processes; 
• normal/safe, abnormal and emergency operations, conditions and procedures 
including parametric sensitivity for exothermic reactions; 
• control of reactants quality and impurities; 
• control and safety back-up systems; 
• maintenance programs and procedures; 
• procedures for safety critical modifications and reviews of the processes; 
• training programs and safety instructions. 
1 There are two main types ot' hazardous reactions: planned reactions that during their operation become 
unstable and go out of control and unwanted (often decomposition) reactions. In addition to their 
relevance in processes, the latter may be relevant to the storage and transport of substances, where the 
need for control and preventive measures may not otherwise be forseen. 
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Past runaway events and accident causation factors 
It is not unusual for accidents initiated by runaway reactions to be accompanied by severe 
and irreversible consequences e.g. fatalities, damage requiring plant demolition and 
abandonment. In addition, industrial experience has shown that runaways are as likely to 
occur in medium/small sized "non-major" hazards sites, as in major hazards sites. Hence 
the selection of a suitable methodology for the relevant hazards to be identified can be 
assisted by the inputs provided by the analysis of past events. 
Among the most frequent immediate and underlying causes identified in past accidents 
specific to runaway reactions are: 
• insufficient knowledge of the process chemistry; 
• insufficient evaluations and reviews; 
• incorrect operational procedures e.g. mischarging or reactants; 
• lack of mixing; 
• low quality of reactants; 
• safety critical modifications that are unauthorised, insufficiently hazard studied or not 
documented; 
• inadequate reactor maintenance: 
• insufficient reactor operating instructions, procedures and training. 
Identification of the hazard and risk assessment 
SR should outline the principles and procedures followed to identify the hazards involved 
in runaway reactions. Hazard identification and risk assessment are particularly important 
and is best carried out by a team of qualified people such as chemical engineers and 
chemists, using various methods. Screening methods shall be addressed related to: 
A. classification of reacting system; 
B. hazard testing; 
C. risk assessment accompanied by preventive and mitigation measures. 
\ Classification of reacting system 
The reacting system classification can contribute the recognition of hazards already 
identified in similar systems. Several criteria may be used i.e. Arrhenius and Non -
Arrhenius reactions, homogeneous and heterogeneous runaways, combinations of 
initiating events including reactant accumulation, loss of cooling, external heating, 
solvent evaporation etc. 
Β Hazard testing 
Hazard testing is important and should be performed using various screening 
methods for the evaluation of the characteristic parameters of runaway. Hazard 
identification methods may require data on: 
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• chemical formulas; 
• hazardous mixtures of substances; 
• list of dangerous reactions; 
• calculation of the Oxygen balance; 
• several established indices e.g. CHETAH indices; 
• accident analysis of relevant past events; 
• thermochemical parameters. 
An indicative list of possible thermochemical parameters to be evaluated and the 
methods to be used for this is given below: 
Parameters: 
• onset temperature and heat of reaction for the exotherm and for secondary 
exotherms; 
• decomposition of reagents i.e. the decomposition temperatures for the production 
of gases and the loss of weight during thermal decomposition (thermogravimetry); 
• adiabatic2 heat generation rates under relevant (e.g. runaway) conditions; 
• gas generation rates under relevant (e.g. runaway) conditions; 
• pressure effect; 
• range of standard operating conditions e.g. safety temperature; 
• impurities of reactants. 
Hazard Identification Methods: 
• thermal analytical methods e.g. DSC/DTA; 
• isothermal, isoperibolic, dynamic, adiabatic and pseudo-adiabatic calorimetrie 
methods; 
• runaway reaction simulation using computer models; 
• established indices e.g. Dow index 
Operators should make the best use of available hazard data and if not sufficient 
laboratory and desk top tests should be performed to estimate the extent of hazard. In 
scaling up from laboratory to real size, uncertainties and necessary extrapolations 
involved in the reaction parameters should be also considered. 
C Risk assessment - preventive and mitigation measures 
Risk assessment is essential to evaluate the likelihood of runaway and the severity of 
its potential consequences. The extent of risk analysis and the intensity of the 
'■ Tests must be adiabatic with respect to reactor contents; heat loss from the contents to the wall can be 
very important. 
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preventive and mitigation measures should be commensurate to the risk involved. 
Simple models of hazard identification may not be always sufficient. A list of typical 
failure modes may be helpful. 
There exist several approaches to perform risk assessment. The choice of a particular 
technique may be process-specific. Although detailed assessment using for example 
CHETAH indices is advisable in several cases, it cannot be considered always 
necessary unless otherwise sustained by cost-effective analysis. Simple screening 
techniques on the other hand, can be sufficient only when combined together with 
the scale and frequency the usual batch operations are performed, and thus could 
constitute an adequate basis for discussion criteria to whether further assessment is 
needed. 
Inherently safer design includes substitutions, intensification and attenuation. A 
viable process would require the implementation of prevention and control measures 
such as sensors, trips, alarms, control systems, and protective and mitigation 
measures such as reactor emergency reliefs, crash cooling, reaction inhibition, 
secondary containment,etc. 
Design reactor relief regulations applying in all circumstances are not common. Not 
venting may be acceptable when risk has been reduced to an acceptable level. The 
necessity of some measures, e.g. explosion vents, may sometimes need to be 
balanced against cost or environmental and technical constrains. 
Emergency plans should consider among others injury to key emergency personnel. 
Re-examination of the measures taken in established processes may be needed when 
hazards are not adequately identified. Audits can contribute to this by providing 
considerable inputs and are expected to be triggered by the legal requirement of 
updating the Safety Report of installations involving hazardous reactions. 
Relevant material can be found in several references including the following: 
1. "Safety and Runaway Reactions" Eds N. Mitchison & B. Smeder, Proceedings of EC 
seminar on Runaway Reaction Hazards, JRC, Frankfurt October 1994 
2. Seminar Diskontinuierliche Exotherme Verfahren in Produktiosanlagen, Köln - 18/19 Mai 
1993, BPU - Beratungs- und Planungsgesellschaft für Umweltschutztechnik und 
Anlagesicherheit, CDCIR 1444 
3. Ermittlung und Bewertung von Kenngrössen zur Beurteilung der thermischen Sicherheit 
chemischer Prozesse; T.Grewer, H.Kluracek, U.Löffler, R.L.Rogers, J.Steinbach; in 
Fortschritte der Sicherheitstechnik II, DECHEMA- Monographien Bd. Il l , VCH 
Verlagsgesellschaft 1988 
4. Ablauf durchgehender Reactionen sowie Auswahl und Führung von sicheren Prozessen. 
J.L. Gustin, Chem. Ing. Tech. 65 (1993) 4, 415/422 
5. Erkennen und Beherrschen exothermer chemischer Reactionen. Technischer Ausschuss für 
Anlagensicherheit, Leitfaden TAA-GS-05 
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6. Exotherme chemische Reactionen-Grundlagen. Merkblatt RÜ01, ZH 1/89. 
Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen Industrie, I 1/95 
7. Thermische Prozess-Sichcrheit; R.J.Olt, Schriftenreihe der Expertenkommission für 
Sicherheit in der chemischen Industrie in der Schweiz. Heft 8. 1988 
8. Sécurité des procédés: la prévention des emballements de réaction, Cahier de sécurité, 
Union des Industies Chimiques, no 12- UIC Dec 1992 
9. Stabilità Termica e Reattività: Incidenti da Monomeri, Stazione Sperimentale per i 
Combustibili, 1985, CDCIR 1 18 
10. La Evaluación del Riesgo químico en Procesos Industriales- Jornada Tecnica - Barcelona, 
16 de Diciembre de 1993. Instituto Nacional de Seguridad e Higiene en el Trabajo, Centro 
Nacional de Condiciones de Trabajo. 1993, CDCIR 1572 
1 I. Safety of Chemical Batch Reactors and Storage Tanks, Commission of the European 
Communities. JRC - Institute for Safety Research. Ispra Italy - Editors A. Benuzzi, J. M. 
Zaldivar, Kluwer Academic Publishers. EUR 13457, 1991, CDCIR 785 
12. Conference on Control and Prevention of Runaway Chemical Reaction Hazards. 
Amsterdam Nov. 1986. IBC Techn. Serv.. London 1986 
13. Fourth International - European Conference on Assessment and Control of Chemical 
Reaction Hazards. London Dec. 1993. IBC Tech., Services London. 1993 
14. International Symposium on Runaway Reactions, American Inst, of Chem. Engineers 
(AIChE), 1989, CDCIR 983 
15. Chemical Reaction Hazards, J.Barton & R.Rogcrs, 2nd Edition 1997. IChemE UK 
16. Thermal Hazards of Chemical Reactions. Grewer T., Industrial Safety Series, Vol. 4. 
Elsevier, 1994 
17. Méthodologie pour Γ étude et le contóle du risque d'emballement thermique dans 
l'industrie chimique. Gustin J.L., Sécurité - Sciences et techniques. No 14. 5-22, 1994 
18. Bretherick's Reactive Chemical Hazards, 2Vol, 5th Edit.Butterworth-Heinemann 1996 
19. Guidelines for Chemical Reactivity Evaluation and Application to Process Design, 1995 
AIChE/CCPS 
20. Emergency Relief System Design using DIERS Technology, H. G. Fisher et al. - The 
Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS), 1992 
21. RELIEF code for emergency pressure relief studies. User manual. Ν.Brinkhof, J.S. 
Duffield. R. Nijsing, JRC EC, EUR 16267 EN, JRC 1995 
22. SAFIRE. Program for design of emergency pressure relief systems. D.A. Shaw, Chem. 
Eng. Prog. 86(7), 1990 
23. DIERS. DIERS Project Manual. AIChE, 1988. 
24. International Symposium on Runaway Reactions and Pressure Relief Design. 
AlChE/DIERS. August 1995 
25. Thermal process safety; data, assessment criteria, measures. Booklet 8, Expert Commission 
for Safely in the Swiss Chemical Industry. SUVA, Lucerne. Switzerland 
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External Hazard Sources 
External activities or events are important sources of hazard. The safety report should 
identify those relevant to the site. A list of possible hazard sources is the following: 
A Impact of accidents (fire, explosions, toxic release) in neighbouring installations and 
transportation networks 
• independent installations located at the same establishment; 
• installations located outside the establishment fence; 
• transportation of dangerous substances in site - off site (i.e. roads, railways, 
pipelines, shipping, oil or gas ports, air, etc.). 
Β Functional interdependence with neighbouring activities 
• installations; 
• pipelines: 
• common utilities; 
• other. 
C Transport networks and centres 
• works roads including access roads; 
• public roads close to the installation and/or establishment; 
• railway; 
• airports. 
D Natural hazard sources 
• precipitation (extremc)/rain- snow-hail: 
• wind, hurricane, thunderstorms, etc.; 
• temperature extreme: 
• lightning & static electricity; 
• floods: 
• seismic activity; 
• landslide, subsidence; 
• wildfire. 
E Neighbouring/adjacent networks 
• sewage networks; 
• hydraulic networks; 
• other. 
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Relevant material on risks external to the installation can be found in several 
references (i.e. transportation, natural hazards, knock-on effects etc.). A list of 
relevant titles is the following: 
1. Hazards from Neighbouring Installations, Case study, 3rd Int. Symp. 'Loss Prevention & 
Safety Promotion in the Process Industries', Basel. Switzerland (Sept. 1980), pp. 1527-
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Heft 2/1993. 
4. Recommendation regarding the loading, transportation and unloading European 
Confederation of Control Organisations (CEOC), CEOC - Confédération Européenne 
d'Organismes de Contrôle - rue de Commerce 20-22. B-1040 Bruxelles. Belgium 
5. The implementation of Seveso Directive in Netherlands with emphasis to transportation 
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Physical Planning and Environment The Netherlands VROM 1992 
6. ARIPAR, Relazione sui Risultati, (Analisi e controllo dei Rischi Industriali e Portuali 
dell'Area di Ravenna), Reg. Emiglia-Romagna, Commune di Ravenna. Italy 1992 
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Administration, 400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590, USA, 1983 
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No.3, pp. 160-164, AIChE 
9. Rechtliche und technische Aspekte der Sicherheitkonzeption von Fern-und 
Verbindungsleitungen zum Transport brennbarer Flüssigkeiten. ÖKO-Institut, Inst, für 
angewandte Ökologie, Freiburg, FRG 1993 
10. Manuel III de l'Ordonnance sur les Accidents Majeurs OPAM Directives pour Voies de 
Communication, Federal Agency for Environment. Forestry and Landscapes. (BUWAL. 
OFEP. UFAFP, UFAGC), Switzerland, Office Fédéral des imprimés et du matériel, 3000 
Bern. Switzerland (available also in German and Italian) 1992 
11. "Strategies for Transporting Dangerous Goods by Road: Safety and Environmental 
Protection, hosted by the Swedish authorities June 1992 in Karstad, Sweden. OECD 
Envir.Monograph No66, OECD 1993 
12. Societal risk curves for Historical hazardous chemicals transportation accidents, IChemE 
Symposium Series No. 110 ( 1988), pp. 133-147 
13. Sicherheitsbericht über die Lagerung und den "Über-Land-Transport" von Flüssiggas. 
Applied Technology Corp. Norman OK 73070. CDCIR 141 
14. Technological Risk in Modern Society, IIASA, Laxenburg. Austria. March 18-20. (safety 
issues, control and management of accidents in power systems or other potentially high-
risk utilities), Editors: B. Segerståhl, G. Krömer, IIASA - International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 1988 
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16. Proceedings of Domino Effects seminar. Leuven Belgium, Sept. 1996, JRC 
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CDCIR 222 
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25. Il Rischio sismico nelle industrie di processo e nei sistemi territoriali interconnessi, 
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This document is intended to provide guidance on the preparation of "Safety Reports" to 
meet the requirements of the Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC), on the control of major 
accidents involving dangerous substances. Section-1 analyses contents and structures 
for the description of the establishment and its environment. Section-2 describes 
requirements concerning hazard identification and risk assessment and the final section 
refers to information concerning major accident prevention policy and emergency 
planning. The document is enriched by the discussion of topical issues and relevant 
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